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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah
Court of Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(e) , Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

DID THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE COMPETENT LEGAL REPRESENTATION
AT TRIAL?

Utah has adopted the two prong Strickland

test for analyzing
State

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
P.2d 1332 (Utah Ct.App.1995); Strickland
668,

104 S. Ct. 2052

appellant

must

Perry,

Washington,

demonstrate

that

his

899

466 U.S.

Under the Strickland

(1984).

first

v.

v.

test, the

legal

counsel's

representation fell below an object standard of reasonableness.
The

appellant

must

then

show

that,

but

for

his

counsel's

unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.
appellant must meet both prongs of the Stickland
v.

Cook,

To prevail, the
test.

Fernandes

870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that is raised
for the first time on appeal is a question of law.
Bryant,

965 P.2d 539 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

State

v.

Review of the trial

counsel's choices regarding trial strategy is highly deferential,
even if the choices are incorrect in hindsight.
850 P„2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

1

State

v.

Tennyson,

II.

DID THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ALLOW LAY WITNESSES TO
TESTIFY TO LEGAL CONCLUSIONS?

The appropriate standard of review for this issue is the plain
State

error standard.

v.

Bryant,

965 P. 2d 539

(Utah Ct. App.

1998) .
III. DID CERTAIN REMARKS OF
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT?
The
standard.

appropriate
State

v.

standard
Dunn,

of

THE

PROSECUTOR

review

is

the

CONSTITUTE

plain

850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993).

error

Whether a

prosecutors remarks or actions constitute prosecutorial misconduct
is determined by applying the two part test set forth in State
Kohl,

v.

2000 UT 35 522; 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (2000).
IV.

DID THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRET SECTION 76-101204, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS ONE COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE
CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE?

The

Court

interpretation

of
of

Appeals
the

should

statute

for

deference to it's conclusions of law.

review

the

correctness
State

v.

trial
and

Keppler,

court's

accord

no

1999 UT

App 89, f4; 976 P.2d 99.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
76-10-12 04

Distributing pornographic material.

(1) A person is guilty of distributing pornographic material when
he knowingly:
(a) sends or brings any pornographic material into the state
with intent to distribute or exhibit it to others;
(b) prepares, publishes, prints, or possesses any pornographic
material with intent to distribute or exhibit it to others;
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(c) distributes or offers to distribute, exhibits or offers to
exhibit any pornographic material to others;
(d) writes, creates, or solicits the publication or advertising
of pornographic material;
(e) promotes the distribution or exhibition of material he
represents to be pornographic; or
(f) presents or directs a pornographic performance in any
public place or any place exposed to public view or participates in
that portion of the performance which makes it pornographic.
(2) Each distributing of pornographic material as defined in
Subsection (1) is a separate offense.
(3) It is a separate offense under this section for:

(a) each day's exhibition of any pornographic motion picture
film; and
(b) each day in which any pornographic publication is displayed
or exhibited in a public place with intent to distribute or exhibit
it to others.
(4) Each separate offense under this section is a class A
misdemeanor punishable by:
(a) a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $100 plus $10 for
each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law; and
(b) incarceration, without suspension of sentence in any way,
for a term of not less than seven days, notwithstanding any
provisions of Section 77- 18-1.
(5) If a defendant has already been convicted once under this
section, each separate further offense is a third degree felony
punishable by a minimum mandatory fine of not less than $1,000 plus
$10 for each article exhibited up to the maximum allowed by law and
by incarceration, without suspension of sentence in any way, for a
term of not less than 30 days. This subsection supersedes Section
77-18-1.
76-1-401
"Single criminal episode" defined --Joinder of offenses
and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition,
11

single criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely
related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment
of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the
effect of Section 77-8a-l in controlling the joinder of offenses
and defendants in criminal proceedings.
76-1-402 Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode
-- Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for
all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode;
however, when the same act of a defendant under a single criminal
episode shall establish offenses which may be punished in different
ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be
3

punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution
under any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a
single criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to
promote justice, a defendant shall not be subject to separate
trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court;
and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the
time the defendant is arraigned on the first information or
indictment.
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged;
or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or
form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense
otherwise included therein; or
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser
included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with
respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis for
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or
an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that
there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for the
offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to support a
conviction
for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that
included offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for the
included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief
is sought by the defendant.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves a prosecution and conviction for three
violations of Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated,
Distributing Pornographic Materials.
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DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Judge Ann Boyden
on February 17, 1999.

The jury found Bhatia guilty of all three

counts of Distributing Pornographic Materials.

On March 18,

1999, Judge Boyden sentenced Bhatia to 365 days in jail on the
count contained in Case No. 981104398.

In Case No. 981104396,

Judge Boyden sentenced Bhatia to 365 days on each of the two
counts.

The two sentences on Case No. 981104396 run concurrently

to each other, but run consecutively to the sentence imposed in
Case No. 981104398. Record 48, P. 40; Record 47, P. I.1
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On

or

about

October

1,

1998, West

information charging Jasbir Bhatia

Valley

City

filed

an

("Bhatia") with one count of

distributing pornographic material, Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code
Annotated.
P.l.

This case was filed as number 981104398.

Record 48,

On or about October 1, 1998, West Valley City filed an

information

charging

Bhatia

with

two

counts

of

distributing

pornographic material, Section 76-10-1204, Utah Code Annotated.
Record 47, P.l.

This case was filed as number 981104396.

The

trial judge denied a defense motion to consolidate these cases with
other charges pending against Bhatia, however, these cases were

1

Record 48 refers to that record originally filed with
the Court of Appeals as Case No. 990248-CA. Record 47 refers to
the record originally filed with the Court of Appeals as Case No.
990247-CA.
5

tried together, before a jury, on February 17, 1999. Record 48, P.
20. Trial Transcript, P. 5.
Prior to trial, the parties entered a stipulation into the
record.

This

stipulation

prohibited

the

parties

from

using

evidence from the other pending cases, the cases that had not been
consolidated into this trial. Trial Transcipt, PP. 5-9.
Also prior to trial, Bhatia made a motion to dismiss one count
from Case No. 981004396.

The basis for the motion was the Single

Criminal Episode Rule, Sections 76-1-401,402, Utah Code Annotated.
Trial Transcript, PP. 9-13.

Judge Boyden took this motion under

advisement until the close of the City's case in chief, at which
time the motion was denied.

Trial Transcript, PP. 161-168.

Trial was held on February 17, 1999. The jury returned a
verdict of guilty on all three counts and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Bhatia operates a sales booth at the Redwood Drive-in swap
meet in West Valley City. Trial Transcript, pp. 108-109.

2.

On April 19, 1998, West Valley City undercover police officers
Newbold and Evans observed Bhatia selling what appeared to
them to be pornographic videotapes. Trial Transcript, pp.
115,131-132.

3.

Officer Evans testified that upon his inquiry, Bhatia told him
that

the

tapes

on

display

6

were

"cable" versions

of

the

videotapes and those were the only ones that he could sell
under Utah law. Trial Transcript, p. 132.
Bhatia

then

volunteered

to

officer

Evans

that

he

could

purchase a "triple X" version from a collection that Bhatia
kept in the back of his booth.

Trial Transcript, p. 132.

Officer Evans accompanied Bhatia into an enclosed area in the
back of the booth and observed the videos.

Officer Evans

eventually purchased a video from Bhatia which was entitled
"Triple Gang Bang." Trial Transcript, pp. 133-134.
As he sold the video to officer Evans, Bhatia gave Officer
Evans a telephone number and told him to call if he wished to
purchase more videotapes. Trial Trancript, pp. 135-136.
On April 24, 1998, Officer Evans made telephone contact with
Bhatia and arranged to purchase additional videotapes. Trial
Transcript, pp. 120, 138-139. Following

the conversation,

Officer Evans, accompanied by Officer Newbold, proceeded to
Bhatia's residence. Trial Transcript, pp. 121, 140. Officer
Newbold stayed in the vehicle while Officer Evans entered the
Bhatia house. Trail Transcript, p. 121.
On

April

24,

1998,

Officer

videotapes from Bhatia.

Evans

purchased

three

more

The titles of these tapes were "Cum

Pumpers No. 12," "Cum Pumpers Volume 9" and "Mafia Girls."
Trial Transcript, p. 141.

7

After viewing the videotapes, Officer Newbold testified that
"Triple Gang Bang," "Cum Pumpers No. 9," and "Cum Pumpers
Volume

12" contained

including

oral,

climaxing.
testified
version

graphic

anal

Trial

and

imagfes

vaginal

Transcript,

p.

of

sexual

penetration
125.

did

not

show

sexual

and

Officer

that the "Mafia Girls" videotape was
that

activity,
males

Newbold

an edited

penetration.

Trial

Transcript, p. 125.
Officer Newbold testified that he could find no story line in
either

"Triple

Gang

Bang," "Cum

Pumpers No.

9,"

or

"Cum

Pumpers Volume 12."
Portions of the three videotapes were shown to the jury. Trial
Transcript, pp. 157-160.

It was stipulated by the parties

that these portions were representative of the portions of the
tape that were not viewed.

Trial Transcript, p. 158.

Under oath, Bhatia admitted selling the videotapes purchased
by Officer Evans at Bhatia's home. Trial Transcript, pp. 177,
179.
Under oath, Bhatia admitted that when he sold the videotapes
to Officer Evans he told Officer Evans that the videotapes
showed penetration.

Trial Transcript, p. 180.

Under oath, Bhatia admitted that he knew that it was illegal
to sell the videotapes.

Trial Transcript, p. 181.

8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

BHATIA RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A COMPETENT DEFENSE
WHICH RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR TRIAL.

Bhatia's argument of ineffective assistance of counsel must
be measured against the two prong test set forth in Strickland
Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

v.

That test

requires that Bhatia demonstrate that his trial counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
and that, but for his counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Fernandez

v. Cook,

870 P.2d 870 (Utah 1993).

Bhatia cannot satisfy either prong of the Strickland

test.

First, Bhatia has failed to request a remand to the trial
court for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 23B of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

As a result, all the parties can

do is speculate as to trial counsel's strategy and motives.
However, all of the actions complained of by Bhatia are either
not supported by the record or could be legitimate trial strategy
decisions made by his trial counsel.

Such decisions by trial

counsel are given great deference by appellate courts.
Tennyson,

State

v.

850 P.2d 461 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)("If a rational bases

for counsel's performance can be articulated, we will assume
counsel acted competently.") Second, Bhatia has not shown that
the outcome of the trial would have likely been different had his

9

trial counsel acted differently.

The evidence against Bhatia is

overwhelming and any perceived errors by his trial counsel and
the conduct of the trial did not affect the core evidence
presented by the City.
II.

A PROSECUTION WITNESS DID NOT IMPROPERLY TESTIFY TO
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS.

Bhatia's contention that a prosecution witness was permitted
to testify as to legal conclusions is without support in the
record.

The two statements described by Bhatia were both made by

Officer Newbold, a lay witness.

In both cases, Officer Newbold

used the word pornography in a factual manner and not as a legal
conclusion.

His opinion that the materials may be

"pornographic", was part of his explanation as to why he began an
investigation.

Statements used in this manner, while using a

legal term, did not violate the Utah Rules of Evidence or
applicable Utah case law.
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT DURING THE TRIAL DID NOT
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.
Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are analyzed under a
two part test.

Bhatia must show that the actions of the

prosecutor called to the attention of the jury a matter which it
would not be justified in considering, and then he must show that
the error by the prosecutor was so substantial that there is a
reasonable likelyhood that, in it's absence that there would have

10

been a more favorable result.

None of the statements complained

of by Bhatia meet this standard.
Bhatia argues that there were several improper statements by
the prosecutor.

The basis for his contention is not supported by

the record as is set forth in several other areas of this brief.
Bhatia's contention that the prosecutor made infammatory
statements to the jury is also not supported by the record.
Bhatia's examples are either taken our of context or so
unsubstantial that they would not influence the outcome of the
trial.

Likewise, the prosecutor's reference to the videos as

"pornographic," if improper, was cured by a jury instruction.
Finally, the prosecutor did make an improper statement to
the court when he described Bhatia's need for an interpreter as a
sham.

However, given the overwhelming evidence against Bhatia,

he has failed to carry his burden to show that this one statement
by the prosecutor effected the outcome of the trial.
IV.

THE COURT INTERPRETED SECTION 76-10-1204, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, IN DENYING BHATIA' S MOTION TO DISMISS ONE
COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE.

In this case, Judge Boyden interpreted the plain language of
Section 76-10-1204, Distributing Pornographic Material to mean
that each tape sold by Bhatia was a separate violation of the
statute.

Judge Boyden relied upon Subsection (2) of Section 76-

10-1204 which states "Each distributing of pornographic material
as defined in Subsection (1) is a separate offense."

11

Judge Boyden correctly determined that this specific
provision in the distributing pornographic materials statute made
the distribution of each separate video tape a separate
violation.

Her analysis that the more specific language in this

statute took president over the more general language of the
single criminal episode statute, Section 76-1-401, is a correct
application of the Utah law of statutory construction.
Vigil,

State

v.

842 P.2d 843 (Utah 1992).
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
I.

BHATIA RECEIVED THE BENEFIT OF A COMPETENT DEFENSE WHICH
RESULTED IN A JUST AND FAIR TRIAL.

Bhatia

argues

that

he

received

ineffective

assistance

of

counsel at trial. This argument is based on the underlying concept
that

his

counsel's

performance

was

so

deficient

that

he

was

deprived of counsel for his defense as guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. A review of the facts
below reveals that this argument is without merit.
Utah has adopted the analytical framework set forth by the
United States Supreme Court for deciding ineffective assistance of
counsel claims under the Sixth Amendment.
1232

(Utah

Strickland
Strickland,

Ct. App.
v. Washington,

1995) .

This

State

framework

v. Perry,
is

set

8 99 P. 2d
forth

in

466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).

In

the United States Supreme Court set forth a two prong

test for analyzing ineffective assistance of counsel cLaims.

12

To

satisfy the first part of the Strickland

test, Bhatia must show

that his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness.

Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 688.

In

order to satisfy the second prong of the test, Bhatia must show
that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the trial would have been
Strickland,

different.

466 U.S. 668, 694; State

v. Baker,

963 P.2d

801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) . If he fails to establish either prong of
the Strickland

test, Bhatia's claim will fail.

U.S. 668, 687; State v. Tennyson,

850 P.2d

461

Strickland,

466

(Utah Ct. App.

1993).
As is set forth below, Bhatia has failed both prongs of the

Strickland

test.
A.

THE ACTIONS OF BHATIA'S TRIAL COUNSEL WERE
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE TRIAL STRATEGY DECISIONS.

Utah law creates a strong presumption of competence by defense
counsel.

In reviewing defense counsel's actions, the court does

not need

to come to a conclusion that counsel had a specific

strategy

m

plausible
Tennyson,

mind, it simply needs to be able to articulate a
strategic

explanation

for defense

counsel's actions.

at page 468.

The presumption of competence is so strong that the Utah Court
of

Appeals

performance

has

stated:

can be

"If

a

rational

basis

for

articulated,

we will

assume

counsel

13

counsel's
acted

competently.
that

in

Indeed, authority from this court supports the notion

ineffective

assistance

claim

succeeds

only

when

conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised
counsel's actions."

Tennyson,

the

"although

case

law

that

at page 468.
defense

no
from

It is also clear from

counsel

must

vigorously

represent his or her client, ^counsel [is] not required bo develop
every conceivable defense that [is] available.'" State

v.

Baker,

963 P.2d 801 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted).
The analysis of the trial strategy decisions made by Bhatia's
trial counsel is hampered by Bhatia's failure to move for a remand
to the trial court for an entry of findings of fact regarding trial
counsel's conduct. Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Because no evidentiary hearing was held by the trial court, any
discussion

of trial counsel's strategy will be performed

factual vacuum, without

in a

the benefit of any knowledge of trial

counsel's actual motives or strategies.
Bhatia's first contention is that his trial counsel failed to
object

at

certain

points

in the

trial.

However,

several

of

Bhatia's examples of his trial counsel's failure to object are
obviously ill founded.
For example, Bhatia complains that his trial counsel failed to
object to certain evidence which went beyond a stipulation entered
into prior to trial.
characterization

Appellants Brief, p.4, p.13, p.16.

of the stipulation
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is simply

incorrect.

This
The

stipulation which was placed on the record was an agreement that
information from other pending cases against Mr. Bhatia would not
come in during this trial.

(Trial Transcript PP. 5-9).

The evidence which is referred to by Bhatia as violating the
stipulation did not relate to any other pending case.

It consisted

of testimony by Officer Newbold that approximately

four months

prior

to the incidents which gave rise to this case, Officer

Newbold had seized similar video tapes from Bhatia.

As Officer

Newbold testified, no charges were filed based upon the earlier
incident in which the tapes were seized.

(Trial Transcript, P.

114) . Therefore, the testimony of Officer Newbold did not violate
the terms of the stipulation which
related to other pending charges.

simply prohibited

evidence

Obviously understanding the

nature of the stipulation, Bhatia's trial counsel did not object to
this testimony.
Another example of the shallowness of Bhatia's arguments, is
his contention

that defense counsel failed to object when the

prosecutor improperly led witnesses on direct examination.
argument is so inconsequential that it is almost absurd.

This

In each

instance referred to by Bhatia, the prosecutor simply asked the
witness if he recognized the "gentleman over here with the green
sweater on" as Mr. Bhatia.

Trial transcript, PP. 109,138-139.

Bhatia's identity was never in doubt or at issue during the trial
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and an objection to such a question by the prosecutor would not
have furthered Mr. Bhatia's case.
Also, based upon reading Bhatia's argument, one could almost
come to the conclusion that his trial counsel never objected during
the course of the trial.

That is not the case.

Bhatia's trial

counsel made numerous objections throughout the course of the trial
as he vigorously defended his client.

Bhatia's attempt to use

hindsight

counsel's

to

second

guess

his

trial

strategy

and

objectives without any evidentiary process to determine what that
strategy may be, is not persuasive.

Without any further evidence,

we should defer to Bhatia's trial counsel and presume that he had
a competent trial strategy in mind and his decisions on when or
when not to object were in keeping with that strategy.
Bhatia's other arguments regarding ineffective assistance of
counsel are also without merit.

He argues that it was ineffective

assistance

to

for

trial

evaluation of Bhatia.

counsel

by Bhatia's

preferred

hearings

cultural reasons.

not

to

request

psychiatric

This contention is based on virtually no

evidence in the record.
statement

fail

First, Bhatia points to a post trial

counsel
be

set

reminding
on

the judge that

Thursday

(Trial Transcript, P.231).

for

Bhatia

religious

and

Bhatia offers no

explanation as to why, although that belief may be outside of the
norm for American culture, it is an indication of mental illness.
Second, Bhatia points to his lack of knowledge regarding the United
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States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
(Trial Transcript, P. 170).

This lack of understanding

should

certainly not be surprising from someone who appears to have been
raised in another country/or culture.

Neither of these instances,

either by themselves or together, provide an indication that Bhatia
has a mental problem.
Finally, Bhatia argues that his trial counsel entered into
certain stipulations without his consent, that his trial counsel
did not prepare properly for trial, and that his trial counsel
failed to make an opening statement.

However, he has failed to

support these contentions.
The argument that his trial counsel entered into stipulations
without his consent has no basis in the record.
indication

from

stipulations.

the

record

that

Bhatia

There is no

objected

to

these

His contention that these stipulations were without

his consent constitutes new evidence being interjected into the
appellate process.

Such evidence is outside the record and should

not be considered by this court.

State

v. Bredehoft,

966 P.2d 285

(Utah Ct. App. 1998).
Also, the stipulations had strategic benefit to Bhatia.

One

stipulation kept out evidence of other charges that were pending
against him.

The other stipulation conceded that the videotapes

just showed sexual activity and had no plot; that they possessed no
artistic, literary or scientific value.
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This point was testified

to by the witnesses and was apparent from the videos themselves.
His closing argument reveals that defense counsels basic strategy
to argue that the community standards of Salt Lake County accepted
this type of material. To belabor this obviously

losing point

regarding the nature of the material in front of the jury probably
would not have advanced Bhatia's case, nor would it have made the
jury more sympathetic to his cause.
Likewise there is no evidence to support the contention that
Bhatia's trial counsel was unprepared for trial.

Bhatia simply

points to an occasion during trial when a potential witness entered
the courtroom.

Bhatia's counsel then asked for a short continuance

during which he could question the potential witness.

(Trial

Transcript, PP 127-128).
Bhatia has presented nothing more than this.

There is no

evidence concerning his trial counsel's other preparations

for

trial, nor is there any evidence regarding this particular witness.
It is unknown whether or not Bhatia's trial counsel had

previously

spoken with this witness, or what efforts he may have made to
attempt to contact and ascertain the testimony of this witness
prior to trial.

Once again Bhatia is asking this court to operate

in a factual vacuum and second guess his trial counsel's actions
based upon few, if any, facts.
His last contention is his trial counsel's decision to forego
an opening

statement. There could me several reasons why this
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decision was made.

For example, it may have been based upon trial

counsel's reading of the attitude and demeanor of the jury at that
point in the trial.' However, we can only speculate, since Bhatia
failed to request a Rule 23B hearing.
Based on the forgoing, it is apparent from the record that
Bhatia's trial counsel met an objective standard of reasonableness.
It is also apparent that Bhatia has failed to provide this court
with sufficient factual basis for determining that the actions of
his trial counsel were ineffective or in violation of his Sixth
Amendment rights.
B.

THE JURY'S VERDICT IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE AND ANY ALLEGED ERRORS BY BHATIA'S TRIAL
COUNSEL DID NOT EFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THE TRIAL.

If, for the sake of argument, the actions of Bhatia's trial
counsel are considered to have fallen below a reasonable level of
competence, Bhatia can still not satisfy the second prong of the
Strickland
prong

test.

of the

In order to meet the requirements of the second

Strickland

test, Bhatia must

show

"a

reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."

Strickland,

466 U.S. 668, 694. In determining whether or not this standard has
been met, the Utah Court of Appeals has stated:
>x

In deciding whether a case should be remanded for retrial on the bases of ineffective assistance of counsel,
"an appellate court should consider the totality of the
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the
errors effected the entire evidentiary picture or have an
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isolated effect and how
supported by the record."'
State
v.
Templin,

strongly

the

evidence

is

Strain,
885 P.2d 810 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) [quoting State
805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990.)]

v.

In this case, the verdict of the jury is strongly supported by
the evidence presented at trial.
trial

counsel

are

considered

Even if the actions of Bhatia's
errors,

rather

than

strategic

decisions, the perceived errors do not begin to affect or overcome
the overwhelming evidence against Bhatia.

First, there can be no

doubt that Bhatia sold the videotapes in question.
Evans and Officer Newbold conclusively testified
events
Bhatia.

that

surrounded

their

purchase

of

the

Both Officer
regarding the

videotapes

from

Also, Bhatia himself testified that he sold at least two

of these particular videotapes to Officer Evans. Trial Transcript,
p.

177. That

he

sold many

Transcript, p. 178.

such videos

to many people. Trial

And, that he told the officer that the video

tapes contained images of sexual penetration. Trial Transcript, p.
180.
Based

upon

the

evidence

presented

at

trial,

the

only

reasonable conclusion is that the tapes presented at trial had been
sold by Mr. Bhatia.

Furthermore, by his own testimony, Bhatia

admitted that he knew that the videotapes contained images similar
to those depicted on their covers (Trial Transcript, pp. 180,181);
and,

that

Transcript,

they
p.

contained
180.

images

Finally,

of

sexual

Bhatia
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also

penetration.
testified

Trial

that

he

understood that the selling of such material was illegal. Trial
Transcript, p. 181.
Based on the forgoing, it is undisputed that Bhatia sold the
videotapes at issue and that he sold them with knowledge of their
contents and an understanding that to sell such videotapes was in
violation of the law.
The issue of whether or not the videos themselves meet the
definition of pornographic materials set forth in Section 76-101203, Utah Code Annotated, was determined by the jury after viewing
a representative sample of the content of the videos.
parties

had

stipulated

that

the

videos

did

not

Since the

have

serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, the only issue
for

the

jury

was whether

or not

an average

person,

applying

contemporary community standards, would find that the videos appeal
to prurient interest in sex and are patently offensive in their
descriptions or depictions of nudity and sexual conduct.
Although

the jury made their finding based upon

actually

viewing portions of the video tapes, there are certain portions of
the testimony which also support their findings.
Officer

Newbold

testified

that

he personally

For example,

viewed

all

videotapes that the Police Department purchased from Bhatia.

four
He

testified that in the three videotapes which resulted in the filing
of these charges, he was able to find no discernable story line and
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that all three videotapes showed vaginal, anal, and oral sexual
penetration, and showed males climaxing.
Based upon the content of the videotapes themselves, which
were placed into evidence as prosecution Exhibits 1, 3, and 4, and
upon

the

testimony

of

the

factual

standards,
evidence

Bhatia

of

found

the

Other than his trial counsel's argument regarding the

to

definition

jury

material."

community

the

the

content

defense

meet

Newbold,

videotapes

contemporary

to

Officer

"pornographic

essentially

contained

in

the

had

no

videotapes

themselves.
The

evidence

upon which

the jury

found Bhatia

guilty

of

distributing pornographic material was overwhelming. Any perceived
errors by his trial counsel in the conduct of the trial did not
affect

the

determined

core
that

pornographic

evidence
the

presented

videotapes

material

and

it

met
was

by
the

the

City.

legal

undisputed

The

definition
that

jury
for

Bhatia

intentionally sold the videotapes with full knowledge of their
content.

Bhatia

has

failed

to meet

the

second

prong

of the

Strickland

test by showing that the alleged errors of his trial

counsel would have affected the outcome of the trial.
II.

A PROSECUTION WITNESS DID NOT IMPROPERLY TESTIFY TO LEGAL
CONCLUSIONS.

Bhatia's contention that a prosecution witness was permitted
to testify

as to legal

conclusions
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is without

support

in the

record.

Statements of the type that occurred in this case do not

violate the evidentiary rules, nor did they prejudice the jury.
There are two statements in the transcript which are referred
to by Bhatia as impermissible legal conclusions.

In the first of

these statements Officer Newbold was asked what he decided to do
after viewing the first videotape that had been purchased.

Officer

Newbold's response was "Once I viewed the tape and felt that the
contents was of a pornographic or harmful material, I began a — a n
investigation
Bhatia."

into the distribution of pornography

Trial Transcript, PP. 119, 120.

from Jasbir

In the second statement

Officer Newbold was asked what he viewed in the sack of items that
Officer Evans had purchased at Bhatia's house.

Officer Newbold

replied "He had three video cassettes, two of them appeared to be
pornographic material and then the third one just from viewing it,
didn't appear to be pornographic."

These statements by Officer

Newbold were not made in violation of the rules.
The Utah Rules of Evidence provide that the testimony of a lay
witness is limited to opinions and inferences which are rationally
based on the witnesses perception and helpful to the fact finder to
clearly understand the witnesses testimony or determine a fact in
issue.

Rule 701, Utah Rules of Evidence; State

539, 547.

v. Bryant,

965 P.2d

Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence specifically states

that "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
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In Bryant,

issue to be decided by the trier of fact."
quotes State

v.

Larsen,

the court

828 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) which

stated that " . . . the determination of whether [a witnesses] opinion
embraces

an

ultimate

factual

issue

or

constitutes

a

legal

conclusion is a difficult call...." However, the court determined
that a witness may use a legal term when the testimony is factual
and not a legal conclusion.
In this
expert,

was

Bryant,

P.548.

case, Officer Newbold, a lay witness
not

instructing

conclusion to be considered.

the

jury

in

the

and not an

ultimate

legal

Rather, Officer Newbold's statement

was a factual statement which was based upon his perception and was
necessary

to clearly

understand

his

testimony.

In the

first

instance, his perception that the videotape was pornographic was
part

of

his

explanation

investigation.
purpose.

The

second

as

to

why

statement

he
was

began
made

for

a

criminal
a

similar

It merely conveyed to the jury his perception that the

second and third videotapes were of a similar type to the first
videotape that had initiated the investigation.
in both the Bryant

and Larsen

As was described

cases cited above, these types of

statements are not prohibited by the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Finally, any possible prejudicial effect of these statements
was cured by the jury instructions.

Instruction No. 6 specifically

stated that only the jury, applying the tests given by the court,
can find the videotapes to be obscene or pornographic.
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Trial

Transcript P. 200.

Instruction No. 7 describes the various common

meanings and usages of terms used throughout the trial, such as
"obscene", "obsceni'ty", "pornography", or "pornographic".

That

instruction further instructs the jury to only use the definition
provided them by the court and disregard the terms when used at
other

times

or

in

other

contexts. Trial

Transcript,

P. 200.

Instruction No. 8 provides the jury with the legal definition of
pornographic

material

found

in

Section

76-10-203,

Utah

Code

Annotated.
Based on the forgoing, it is clear that Officer Newbold' s use
of the word pornographic was not in violation of the Utah Rules of
Evidence, nor was the outcome of the trial affected in any manner.
III. THE PROSECUTOR'S CONDUCT DURING THE
CONSTITUTE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT.

TRIAL

DID

NOT

Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct are analyzed under a
two part test.

First, Bhatia must show that the actions or remarks

of the prosecutor called to the attention of the jury a matter
which it would not be justified in considering and determining its
verdict.

Assuming the first prong of the test has been met, Bhatia

then has the burden to show that the error by the prosecutor was so
substantial and prejudicial that there is a reasonable likelihood
that,

in its absence, there would have been a more

result.

State

v.

Kohl,

favorable

2000 UT 35 122; 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3

(2000).
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Bhatia argues that several statements made by the prosecutor
were improper. This brief has already addressed three of the areas
in which

he makes ' this claim.

prosecutor
stipulation.

elicited

testimony

First, is the claim
in

violation

of

the

that

the

pre-trial

As was set forth above, this argument is based upon

Bhatia's mischaracterization of that stipulation.
of the stipulation

A close reading

reveals that testimony regarding

which were confiscated

videotapes

from Bhatia on a previous date was not

prohibited by the stipulation.

The stipulation only prohibited

evidence of other pending charges.

There were no pending charges

from the videotape confiscation incident.
Bhatia

also

argues

that

this

evidence

was

inadmissible

character evidence under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.
argument is also without merit.

This

As Bhatia admits in his brief,

"Specifically, in closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the
facts the tapes had been confiscated from Bhatia prior to the dates
of the incidents charged proved his intent."
P.21.

Appellant Brief,

Demonstrating proof of intent was also the explanation given

by the prosecutor in response to an objection to this line of
questioning during trial.

Trial Transcript, P.112.

Rule 404(b)

specifically states that evidence of other acts "...may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of . , . intent...."
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. The evidence elicited by the
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prosecutor clearly falls within the "intent" exception to Rule
404(b) and was not improper.
The other two 'arguments that have been previously discussed
regard legal conclusions elicited from prosecution witnesses and
leading witnesses under direct examination.

As was set forth

above, these two arguments are not well founded.

Officer Newbold's

testimony did not contain legal conclusions but rather factual
conclusions that clarified his testimony. The complaints regarding
leading witnesses on direct examination were limited solely to
identification of Bhatia by the police officers, something that was
not at issue at trial.
Bhatia's next contention regarding prosecutorial misconduct is
his allegation of inflamatory comments made by the prosecutor.

He

cites four comments in the record that he believes to be improper.
In the first instance, the prosecutor states "This isn't going to
be a case where you just decide the evidence from the witnesses on
the stand; unfortunately, you have to or get to (inaudible) view
three videos and I'll describe those to you in a minute and their
contents is going to be questionable and that's going to be the
decision

that

you

are

going

to

have

to

make,

is,

is

that

pornographic by the standards of our community." Bhatia's objection
to this statement seems to be the prosecutors use of the word
"unfortunately".

However Bhatia fails to explain how the use of
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this word in this instance can or will influence the outcome of the
trial.
The second allegedly inflammatory comment that Bhatia takes
issue with is the prosecutor's statement that after watching the
entire ten hours of videos "We're not sure you can drive home after
something like that." Again Bhatia fails to explain or show how
this comment has affected the outcome of the trial.
The third allegedly inflammatory comment that Bhatia points to
has been taken out of context.

In his brief, Bhatia states "The

prosecutor told the jury that the evidence would make them sick."
Appellants Brief, P.21. This is a complete mis-characterization of
the statement made by the prosecutor.

The prosecutor's statement

in it's entirety is as follows: "Now, I would love to tell you that
it's just as simple as the City proving that this stuff makes you
sick to your stomach, but it's not.

The law requires specific

things and the burden is upon the citizens of West Valley to prove
that to you, that burden is to prove a three- prong test."

The

prosecutor

the

then

goes

on

to

"pornographic material" test.

explain

the

three

prongs

of

Trial Transcript, pp. 102-103.

As

a reading of the complete quote shows, the prosecutor did not tell
them that the evidence would make them sick, to the contrary, he
was telling them that even if the evidence made them sick, that is
not enough.

The statement was made in the context of explaining

the three prongs that must be met in order for the City to carry

28

it's

burden

of

proof

in

the

case.

This

statement

is

not

prosecutorial misconduct.
The

final

statement

Bhatia

believes

to

be

inflammatory

occurred immediately prior to the showing of the videos to the
jury.

At that time, the prosecutor informed the court that several

people, including the interpreter, would prefer not to see the
videos and would like to exit the courtroom.
subject

between

the

court

Transcript, pp. 151-153.

and

both

A discussion of the

counsel

followed.

Trial

Bhatia completely fails to explain why

this statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct or how this
statement impacted the jury or affected the outcome of the trial.
The allegedly inflammatory statements about which Bhatia now
complains are either mis-characterizations of the actual statements
or do not meet the test set forth in the Kohl case. Allowing these
statements was not plain error nor was it prosecutorial misconduct.
Bhatia also complains about the prosecutor's references to the
videos as "pornography."
were

cured

by

the

However, these statements, if improper,

court's

instruction.

Instruction

No.

7

specifically instructed the jury that the term "pornography" has
various common meanings and usages and anticipates that the terms
will be used during the trial.

The instruction begins by stating:

"Throughout this trial and during instruction and argument, the
terms "obscene" or "obscenity" and "pornography" or "pornographic"
have been used." Trial transcript, p. 200. The instruction told the
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jury to only consider pornography to mean that which was defined by
the court and to disregard the term at other times and in other
contexts.

Trial 'Transcript,

P.200.

The

court

thdn

gave

instruction No. 8 which was a detailed definition of a pornography.
Trial Transcript, PP. 200-201. Even if the prosecutor's use of the
word pornography is considered improper, Bhatia has not carried his
burden of showing that the comments were so prejudicial
defeat the mitigating effect of the courts instruction.

Kohl,

as to
P.6,

SI24 .
Finally,

Bhatia

raises

the

issue

regarding

prosecutor's

statement that Bhatia's need for an interpreter was a "sham." Trial
Transcript, P.174.
prosecutor
credibility.

was

The City concedes that this statement by the

improper

and

calls

into

question

Bhatia's

However, he has not carried his burden to show that

this statement affected the outcome of the trial.
Bhatia's credibility was not an issue.

Bhatia admitted that

he sold the videos to the police officers.

Bhatia also admitted

that he knew the content of the videotapes.

If his testimony had

been in conflict with the officers, for example if he had denied
selling the videotapes, then his credibility would be at issue.
However, given the circumstances, this error by the prosecutor is
harmless.
Also, the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct test
requires consideration of the circumstances of the case as a whole.
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If proof of the defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged conduct
by the prosecutor will not be presumed to be prejudicial.
Longshaw,

961 P.2d'925, 931.

Bhatia was overwhelming.

State

v.

In this case, the evidence against

Viewed in that light, this error by the

prosecutor is not substantial and did not effect the outcome of the
trial.
IV.

THE COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED SECTION 76-1-1204, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED, IN DENYING BHATIA' S MOTION TO DISMISS ONE
COUNT BECAUSE OF THE SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE RULE.

Prior to trial, Bhatia moved the court for dismissal of one of
the two counts of distributing pornography that arose from Officer
Evans purchase of videotapes at Bhatia's house. Bhatia argued that
the April 24th purchase by Evans constituted a single

criminal

episode and that he should not be charged with one count for each
videotape purchased.

The court took argument on this issue both

prior to trial and following the City's case in chief.
Transcript PP. 9-13; PP. 161-168.

Trial

Following argument, the trial

court interpreted the language of Section 76-10-1204, Distributing
Pornographic Material, to mean that each separate item distributed
could constitute one count and, therefore, denied Bhatia's motion.

Utah courts have set forth certain standards when faced with
an issue of statutory construction.
the statute should be examined.
(Utah Ct. App. 1998).

State

First, the plain language of
v. Fisher,

972 P.2d 90, 97

Also, the statute should be interpreted in
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order to give effect of the legislature's intent in light of the
purposes the statute was meant to achieve.

State

v. Perez,

2000 UT

App 65, 16.
In this case, Judge Boyden interpreted the plain language of
Section 76-10-1204 to mean that each tape sold by Bhatia was a
separate

violation
of

of the
Section

statute.

Bhatia

76-10-1204.

was

charged

Among

other

under

Subsection

(1)

things,

Subsection

(1) states that a person is guilty of distributing

pornographic material when he knowingly "distributes or offers to
distribute, exhibits or offers to exhibit any pornographic material
to others."

Subsection

(2)of Section 76-10-1204

states

"each

distributing of pornographic material as defined in Subsection (1)
is a separate offense.
Judge Boyden correctly determined that this specific provision
in the statute made the distribution of each separate videotape a
separate violation.
found

in

the

Her analysis that the more specific language

Distributing

Pornographic

Material

statute

took

precedent over the more general language of the Single Criminal
Episode statutes, Section 76-1-401,402, is a correct application of
the Utah law of statutory construction.

State

v.

Vigil,

842 P.2d

843, 845.
The plain language of the statute should prevail and Judge
Boyden's decision to deny Bhatia's motion should be upheld.
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CONCLUSION
Bhatia's arguments on appeal are without merit.

He argues

ineffective assistance of counsel, yet failed to request a Rule 23B
evidentiary hearing and has failed to provide this court with an
evidentiary basis to support his claim.

Bhatia's trial counsel

asserted a vigorous defense on his behalf and his trial strategy
decisions should be accorded great deference.
Bhatia's
conclusions

arguments
and

that

that a lay witness
the

prosecutor

misconduct are also not well founded.

testified

committed

to legal

prosecutorial

The statements referred to

by Bhatia are either taken out of context or constitute harmless
error given the overwhelming evidence presented to the jury.
Finally, the trial judge's decision to deny Bhatia's motion to
dismiss one count from Case No. 981104396 was correct.

Judge

Boyden's ruling that the specific provision in the Distributing
Pornographic Materials statute takes precedence over the generic
terms of the Single Criminal Episode Rule is based upon solid Utah
law regarding statutory construction.
Bhatia received a fair and just trial.

The evidence of his

guilt was overwhelming and the jury's verdicts should be affirmed
by this court.
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